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Abstract There have been several recent attempts to think
about psychological kinds as homologies. Nevertheless,
there are serious epistemic challenges for individuating
homologous psychological kinds, or cognitive homologies.
Some of these challenges are revealed when we look at
competing claims of cognitive homology. This paper
considers two competing homology claims that compare
human anger with putative aggression systems of nonhu-
man animals. The competition between these hypotheses
has been difficult to resolve in part because of what I call
the boundary problem: boundaries between instances of
psychological kinds (e.g., anger and fear) cannot be
directly observed. Thus, there are distinctive difficulties for
individuating psychological kinds across lineages. I draw
four conclusions from this case study: First, recent evi-
dence from the neuroscience of fear suggests that one of
the proposed homologies involves a straightforward con-
flation of anger and fear. Second, this conflation arises
because of the boundary problem. Third, there is an
implicit constraint on the operational criteria that is easy to
overlook in the psychological case. In this case, ignoring
the constraint is part of the problem. Fourth, this is a clear
case in which knowledge of homology cannot be accu-
mulated piecemeal. Identifying homologs of human anger
requires identifying homologs of fear.
Keywords Anger  Aggression  Cognitive homology 
Fear  Homology
Introduction
Homologous traits are traits that are derived from a single,
ancestral trait. Hypotheses of homology are thus historical
explanations for trait similarity (Ereshefsky 2012). Some
have suggested that this kind of homology thinking is
critical for individuating psychological kinds (e.g., Grif-
fiths 1997, 2006; Matthen 2007; Ereshefsky 2012). For
instance, Griffiths argues that homology classes (for now,
classes of traits derived from common ancestral traits)
share deeper similarities in causal structure than analogy
classes (classes of traits that are similar due to conver-
gence). So categories based on homology license extrap-
olative inferences with greater reliability (Griffiths 1994).
It would follow that one research aim of the cognitive
sciences should be to decompose the mind (when possible)
into cognitive traits defined by homology, or cognitive
homologies, to underwrite the kind of extrapolative infer-
ences that mature scientific theories afford.
Some have expressed misgivings about this under-
standing of homology (e.g., Rosenberg and Neander 2009).
However, even if the value of homology is taken for
granted, there are many difficulties in reaping the fruits of
this approach. One symptom of these difficulties is the
existence of competing claims of cognitive homology. In
this article, I consider the case of human anger, in which
competing cognitive homologies have been proposed. I
draw four conclusions from this case study: First, recent
evidence from the neuroscience of fear suggests that one of
the proposed homologies may involve a straightforward
conflation of anger and fear. Second, I argue that this
conflation arises because of the boundary problem: we
cannot directly observe psychological kinds or the bound-
aries between instances of one kind and another. One of the
most prominent strategies for assessing homology is to
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identify similarities that indicate derivation from an
ancestral trait (using the operational criteria of homology),
but anger and fear have many similarities in both humans
and other animals. Since we cannot directly observe
boundaries between instances of anger and fear, their
similarities are especially misleading. Third, there is an
implicit constraint on the operational criteria that is easy to
overlook in the psychological case: the class-specificity
constraint. In this case, ignoring the constraint is part of the
problem, suggesting that the implicit constraint needs to be
an explicit guide for assessing cognitive homology. The
class-specificity constraint motivates the search for
boundaries between distinct psychological kinds in each
organism being compared, and this can mitigate boundary
problems. Fourth, this is a clear case in which knowledge
of homology cannot be accumulated piecemeal. That is,
identifying homologs of human anger requires also iden-
tifying homologs of human fear.
I begin in the second section (‘‘Homology and Competing
Hypotheses’’) by saying more about homology thinking. To
understandwhat kind of evidence supports homology, I point
out a range of hypotheses with which it competes and set out
the kind of evidence that favors homology over and above
them. I point out some of the difficulties in identifying
cognitive homologies, and introduce the operational criteria
of homology, with which some have attempted to address
these problems. The operational criteria of homology (Re-
mane 1971) can be understood as identifying similarities that
provide evidence for homology over and above these com-
peting hypotheses. Moreover, these criteria have been suc-
cessfully applied to identify cases of cognitive homology.
However, in the third section (‘‘Competing Hypotheses
of Homology’’), I consider a specific case in which two
competing homology claims have been made concerning a
single psychological trait, human anger. This emotion has
been compared with two distinct aggression systems in
nonhuman animals, what I call the confrontation and
defense systems. Each of these proposed homologies seems
to satisfy some of the operational criteria; nevertheless,
recent evidence suggests that the defense system is
homologous to fear rather than anger. Essentially, one of
the two hypotheses involves the conflation of two distinct
psychological kinds. It would be difficult to make this kind
of mistake in the case of morphology.
In the fourth section (‘‘Conflating Kinds: The Defense
Hypothesis’’), I attempt a diagnosis. I suggest that the
problem arises because in the domain of psychology one
cannot directly observe boundaries between instances of
homologies, whereas these boundaries are observable in the
paradigmatic case of skeletal morphology. In the domain of
psychology, it is therefore easier to flout an implicit con-
straint on homology claims: what I call the class-specificity
constraint. In the fifth section (‘‘A Constraint on Homology
Claims’’), I argue that this implicit constraint on homology
inferences restricts the kind of evidence admitted in favor of
a hypothesis of homology. Using the criteria of homology in
accordance with this constraint sometimes requires a search
for boundaries or distinguishing characteristics between
instances of two or more psychological kinds. I conclude by
observing that knowledge of homology cannot always be
acquired piecemeal, and in the cognitive domain this may be
the rule rather than a mere exception.
Homology and Competing Hypotheses
To start, let us begin with the concept of homology.
Though the concept of homology is crucial to evolutionary
thinking, it was conceived in the service of biological
taxonomy prior to Darwin’s time. Owen (1846) thought of
homology as the sameness of an organ or structure in
different organisms under every form and function. In pre-
Darwinian science, sameness was determined with refer-
ence to ideal animal archetypes that were divisible into
parts. There is now broad agreement that common ancestry
is a cause of many structural and functional similarities
among organisms and that hypotheses of homology attempt
to capture the similarities attributable to common ancestry.
Despite this consensus, it remains controversial what
exactly determines sameness of structure or function.
Supposing that two traits derive from a trait of a common
ancestor, we can ask, what is it that makes each of these
traits identical to the trait of the common ancestor?
While contemporary accounts of homology give dif-
ferent answers to this question, these accounts are broadly
consistent with the thought that homology is a causal-his-
torical concept (for a clarification and defense of this claim,
see Ereshefsky 2012).1 Specifically, a homology refers to
traits of various animals that are continuous across lin-
eages. In this way, shared ancestry or continuity across a
lineage is the common cause of each homolog (e.g., Assis
and Brigandt 2009), and the effects of ancestry can be
observed at different levels (phenotypic, developmental,
genetic, etc.). Moreover, ancestry as a common cause
provides a historical explanation for similarities between
the homologous traits (whether they are traits of different
organisms or traits of the same organism, as in the case of
serial homology). In the words of Rieppel, homology is
‘‘…grounded in ‘descent, with modification,’ a process that
belongs to the past’’ (Rieppel 2005).
1 For a recent overview and an interesting proposal, see Ramsey and
Peterson (2012). Their idea is that that sameness is determined by
phylogenetic continuity and numerical identity across one or more
hierarchical levels within organisms (e.g., levels at which phenotypes
are observed or at which developmental mechanisms or gene
networks operate).
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As a causal-historical concept, we can sometimes refer
to a homology without having detailed knowledge of the
history of the developmental and hereditary mechanisms
that give rise to each of its instances, just as we can refer to
a disease entity, such as measles or chicken pox, without
knowing about its underlying causes (Putnam 1969).2
Nonetheless, we learn more about each homology as we
learn more about its underlying causes, just as we learn
more about chicken pox as we learn more about the virus
that causes it.
Given the causal-historical nature of homology, there is
a vast range of evidence that could bear on whether or not
one trait is homologous to another. Some of the best evi-
dence pertaining to homology comes from cladistics. If one
has an independently established phylogenetic tree, one can
look at the distribution of a candidate homology, or char-
acter, on that tree. If, for instance, the existence of a
homology is a more parsimonious explanation than con-
vergent evolution on one or more occasion, then there is
some reason to think that a trait is homologous.
Nevertheless, to bring this knowledge to bear on a
hypothesis of homology, one must be able to decompose
organisms into units; units that can be identified across
species. Whereas the causal-historical approach explains
how we can successfully refer to an entity or property in a
given species, successful reference does not guarantee that
one can identify the trait across the entire range of its
manifestations. One might recognize paradigmatic instan-
ces of carbon combustion without successfully identifying
other manifestations of the same oxidative process, such as
rusting iron. Accordingly, a historical definition of
homology actually presupposes a valid decomposition of
organisms into units:
Any phylogenetic investigation starts with a mental
decomposition of the organisms into units of descrip-
tion or characters. Only then can the techniques to
evaluate the historical relationships among character
states be applied and genealogical continuity inferred.
Character definition is expected to be non-arbitrary,
such that the union of a hoof and the cerebellum is not
acceptable as a character. (Wagner 1996, p. 36)
While we can assume that there are many ways to
meaningfully decompose organisms (morphological,
developmental, genetic, psychological, etc.), a central
contention of this article is that meaningful decompositions
can be more difficult to obtain in some domains (e.g., the
cognitive) than others (e.g., the morphological).
This becomes clear when we look at how the homology
concept has been extended to functional categories,
including behavior and psychology (see, e.g., Wenzel
1992; Ereshefsky 2007; Love 2007; Clark 2009; Garcı´a
2010; Murphy 2012). A symptom of the difficulty is this:
the cladistic approach for identifying homologies cannot
always be straightforwardly applied in the domain of
psychology. Before we can even look at the distribution of
a character on a phylogenetic tree, we need to know how to
identify the character in each taxon. This is a difficult
matter when dealing with behavioral and psychological
characters. Psychological characters in particular are not
directly observable, nor are the boundaries between each
one.
Consider aggression research in nonhuman animals.
Some neurophysiologists claim to have identified two
separate aggression systems3 that lead to different forms of
aggression in cats (see, e.g., Siegel 2004; Siegel and Vic-
toroff 2009). Both forms of aggression can be induced
through electrical brain stimulation (EBS) in distinct
regions of the hypothalamus. That is to say that they are
neurally dissociated. The so-called defense system leads to
unconstrained attacks when areas in the cat ventromedial
hypothalamus (VMH) are stimulated, whereas the so-called
predation system leads to ‘‘quiet biting attack’’ (directed at
prey species) when distinct regions are stimulated. This is
just a small piece of the larger body of evidence used to
infer the boundaries between putative psychological or
behavioral categories of defense and predation. Rather than
being directly observable from behavior, these boundaries
were inferred from this considerable evidence base (which
includes neurophysiological work across several species).
Similarly, scientists in the ethological tradition claim to
have identified two separate psychological (or perhaps
behavioral) systems that lead to different forms of
aggression in various rodent species (e.g., Blanchard and
Blanchard 1984, 2003; Adams 2006; Blanchard et al.
2009). For instance, in one experimental paradigm, the
resident-intruder paradigm, a male rat, the resident,
encounters an unfamiliar male rat, the intruder, in the
resident’s territory. The result is that the resident will
engage in repeated attempts to bite the back of the ‘‘in-
truder.’’ This confrontational form of attack is distinct from
the attacks mounted by the intruder, which tend to be
aimed at the snout of the resident rat. This latter form of
attack seems to be aimed at preventing back biting and
creating a window for escape and avoidance, and it is
coordinated with other behaviors (e.g., freezing) that also
subserve defense from predators. A wealth of ethological
observation and experimental data suggests that these
2 We may not be able to individuate homologies without respect to
processes of development, etc. Nevertheless, it is clear that we can
successfully refer to an entity without knowing how to individuate it.
3 I take it that ‘‘aggression’’ is a behavioral or psychological category
rather than a neurophysiological one.
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forms of attack are subserved by distinct psychological
systems, what I call the confrontation and avoidance sys-
tems (see Fig. 1).4 But again, these putative psychological
systems are not directly observed. Rather, scientists have
used empirical methods to infer the boundaries between
putative psychological categories of confrontation and
avoidance.
However, the methods for inferring these boundaries in
rats and cats are simply not appropriate to doing so in many
other species. For instance, the ethological methods appro-
priate to rats are inappropriate to humans and many other
species due to differences in social ecology. Human males,
for instance, are not consistently required to physically
defend territories or dominance position for breeding pur-
poses. Similarly, an ethical constraint on invasive surgical
intervention in humans (of the sort required for EBS in the
hypothalamus) is that the interventions have a therapeutic
aim for the individual being operated on. This limitation
makes it difficult, though not impossible, to test the effects
of EBS in the hypothalamus in humans. Due to relatively
recent development of deep brain stimulation techniques, it
has become possible on occasion to investigate the relation
between psychological states (of panic, aggression, etc.) and
neural activity in the hypothalamus (as I discuss below).
In any case, cladistic tests require methods for individ-
uating a psychological trait in each taxon, and I suggest
later that this sometimes requires distinguishing it from at
least one other trait. Since there are going to be many cases
in which we cannot avail ourselves of the same methods to
individuate psychological traits in humans, and since we
will often be in doubt as to which methods are sufficiently
similar, this cladistic approach to homology sometimes
cannot be applied to psychological traits of humans.
Fig. 1 Confrontation and
avoidance behaviors (e.g., facial
expressions, postures and
maneuvers) of resident and
intruder mice (respectively)
From Defensor and Corley
(2012), p. 683  Elsevier.
Originally published in
Physiology and Behavior
4 Most researchers call these the offense and defense systems. While
some researchers assume that what I call the avoidance system in rats
is of a piece with defense in cats, it has also become the norm to
assume that the avoidance system is closely related to, or even part of,
the fear system (Blanchard and Blanchard 2008; though see also
Gross and Canteras 2012). Nevertheless, other researchers argue that
the defense system is closely related to anger (Panksepp 1998), as I
also discuss below. Introducing my own labels is a way to maintain
distinctions between different lines of research which happen to use
similar terms and to avoid prejudging the matter one way or another.
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One way of addressing this problem is to use the oper-
ational criteria of homology (e.g., Ereshefsky 2007; Love
2007; Clark 2009; Garcı´a 2010; Murphy 2012). These
criteria need not function as a definition of homology but
instead, we can use them to establish a consistent set of
methods for ascertaining homologies and by extension,
identical traits. Importantly, the identification of homolo-
gies via the operational criteria does not depend on any
method for individuating a given trait across clades.
How then do the criteria function? They identify par-
ticular kinds of similarity, the kinds that are best explained
by positing continuity of traits across lineages over and
above a range of competing hypotheses. What are the
competing hypotheses? One is that the similarity is due to
chance convergence (e.g., as a result of drift). Another
more probable possibility is that convergent evolution (due
to adaptation) explains the similarity. This kind of con-
vergence is a clear case of analogy. Still another possibility
in the behavioral domain is that similarity is explained by
plastic developmental processes. In the clearest cases of
plasticity, similarity can be explained entirely by conver-
gent learning, perhaps shaped largely by task demands.5
The main competition is thus between hypotheses of
homology, analogy, and developmental plasticity. Insofar
as they function as evidence, the criteria of homology
should help pick out similarities between traits that are
explained by continuity of traits across lineages and not
convergent evolution or plastic developmental processes.
The most prominent criteria for homology were devel-
oped by Adolf Remane (1971) and can be deployed for this
purpose. While these criteria were developed prior to
cladistic approaches to homology,6 they are fully consistent
with such approaches. Specifically, there is no contradic-
tion in supposing both that animals are best classified into
monophyletic groupings that reflect historical divergences
and that the criteria of homology can be used as evidence
that animals share various traits because those traits existed
prior to a historical divergence. Moreover, the criteria may
be a useful compliment to cladistic approaches when dif-
ficulties arise, as in the case of cognitive homologies.
Remane’s criteria include position, special quality, and
continuity of intermediates, each of which I describe
briefly. The criterion of position applies to the radius and
ulna bones (of tetrapods), because even with different
forms and functions across different organisms, they retain
their position relative to other bones of tetrapod forelimbs
(humerus and the bones of the wrist). It would be highly
unlikely for these characters to have evolved de novo in
each of the different animals that possesses it and yet to
have the same relative position to other structures. More-
over, there are few shared functions across different tet-
rapod species that would explain the distinctive
correspondence. While corresponding position sounds like
a spatial property, it is actually topological, and can include
corresponding positions in temporal sequence or corre-
sponding positions across cognitive architectures (e.g.,
‘‘boxologies’’). For instance, a typical boxological diagram
in psychology may decompose a capacity or process (e.g.,
attention, memory) into distinct processes (short-term
store, selective filter, etc.) and depict the flow of infor-
mation from one process to another. The abstract structure
of such a model could be shared in one or more organisms,
or even duplicated within a single organism (as in the case
of serial cognitive homologies), and this would apparently
be evidence for homology, for the same reason that spatial
position can be evidence for morphological homology.7
The criterion of special quality concerns ‘‘…shared
features [that] cannot be explained by the role of a part in
the life of the organism. The fact that in the vertebrate eye
the blood supply to the retina lies between the retina and
the source of light is a famous example of a ‘special
quality’’’ (Griffiths 2007, p. 648). If two characters are
highly complex, then it is less likely that they would have
independently evolved to have similar qualities. The
location of blood supply to the vertebrate retina is both
complex and nonessential (and even slightly counterpro-
ductive) given the functional role of the retina (what it is
used for in the organism), so it identifies a correspondence
that provides strong evidence that the various instances of
this character derive from continuity across lineages.
Finally, the continuity of intermediates allows identifi-
cation of homologous forms, A and C, because of the
existence of one or more transitional states, B1, …, Bn,
between the two forms. In many cases, the homology
between transitional forms, say between A and B1 or
between B1 and B2, is determined by applying the other
two criteria. For instance, there are transitional states
between the bones of the mammalian inner ear and the
bones of the reptilian jaw. We know this because the bones
of the reptilian jaw share the same position (relative to
other bones of the jaw) as the bones of several intermediate
forms, some of which share the same position as the bones
of the mammalian inner ear.
In recent discussions, these criteria have been used to
support relations of homology between cognitive systems
in various species. For instance, Garcı´a (2013) argues that
processes for face recognition in humans and chimpanzees
5 See Brown (2013) for a detailed discussion of the difficulties (e.g.,
due to the plasticity and transformability of behavior) in applying the
criteria of homology to behavior.
6 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising the point about the
historical precedence of the operational criteria.
7 For a more detailed discussion of how the position criterion should
be understood and assessed, see Love (2007) and Murphy (2012).
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are cognitive homologs. Likewise, Clark (2009) argues that
the human emotion of shame exists in two distinct forms,
one of which is shared with other primates, the other of
which may require distinctively human forms of self-
awareness. Clark argues that these forms of shame are
serial homologs, meaning that these distinct emotions
derive from a single trait of an ancestral organism and are
thus repeated structures within a single organism. Simi-
larly, Murphy (2012) argues that various forms of imagery
share common representational codes with non-imaginary
representations (e.g., of visual or tactile objects) and that
processes of imagination are thus serial homologs of first-
order perceptual processes. Thus, it is clear that these cri-
teria have already been fruitfully employed to begin
decomposing human, primate, and even mammalian minds
more broadly into units defined by homology.
Nevertheless, the fruitfulness of this approach is limited.
Specifically, no extant account of cognitive homology
addresses what I call the boundary problem, which requires
an explication of the boundaries between distinct pro-
cesses. This problem arises when, for instance, we ask of
Clark: why should we think that there are serial homologs
of shame as opposed to a single emotion that interacts with
different mechanisms (some of which may be uniquely
human) to produce distinct shame phenomena? Questions
like this do not always pose problems for scientific
research. However, such problems do arise when we take a
closer look at competing hypotheses of homology.
Competing Hypotheses of Homology
I suspect that there are many instances of competing
homology claims, but I focus here on competing claims
concerning the human emotion of anger. Many emotion
researchers and theorists have suggested that anger is an
innate adaptation (Ekman 1999; Sell et al. 2009). Indeed,
a wealth of research suggests that facial expressions of
human anger appear early in development (even in chil-
dren born deaf and blind) and that these expressions also
appear across cultures (Ekman et al. 1969; Eibl-Eibesfeldt
1973; Izard 1994; Matsumoto and Willingham 2009).
Moreover, some have suggested that similar facial
expressions appear in other primates (Chevalier-Skol-
nikoff 1973; Parr and Waller 2006). This raises the
question of which behaviors might be manifestations of
anger in nonhuman animals. Given the tight link between
anger and aggression in humans, some aggression
researchers propose that innate patterns of aggression in
nonhuman animals (mentioned in the previous section) are
manifestations of anger. In other words, they propose that
the systems responsible for these phenomena are homol-
ogous with human anger, meaning that these complex
traits (human anger and one or more aggression systems
of nonhuman animals) are derived from a common
ancestral trait (and are thus continuous across the relevant
lineages).
As plausible as this may sound, there have been two
incommensurate proposals along these lines, and there has
been little progress in adjudicating between them:
1. Confrontation hypothesis: human anger is homologous
to the behavior program responsible for confronta-
tional behaviors of rats.
2. Defense hypothesis: human anger is homologous with
the system responsible for defensive aggression in cats
(which arises from a neural system that includes the
VMH, the amygdala, and parts of the brain stem).
The confrontation hypothesis holds that confrontational
behaviors (mentioned in the previous section) observed in
resident rats reflect ‘‘an underlying emotional state’’ that is
a primitive version of anger (Blanchard and Blanchard
1984, 1988, 2003). This behavioral repertoire is set in
opposition to the avoidance behaviors observed in intruder
rats, which are thought to reflect fear. Moreover, the
hypothesis holds that these two distinct emotional systems
provide the best way of understanding angry aggression
and fearful aggression (respectively) in humans.
By contrast, the defense hypothesis is that human
experiences of anger ‘‘emerge’’ from a pan-mammalian
brain system (including the VMH and amygdala among
others) that produces defensive behaviors when electrically
stimulated (Panksepp 1998; Panksepp and Zellner 2004;
Blair 2012; Panksepp and Biven 2012). As mentioned in
section two, these behaviors are set in opposition to
predatory behaviors, which are neurally dissociable from
the defensive behaviors. In other words, this hypothesis
holds that there are two neural systems for aggression, and
that one of them, the defense system, provides the primary
neural substrate for human anger and is the proximate
cause of ‘‘the feeling states and behavioral acts’’ (Panksepp
1998, p. 14) distinctive of human anger.8 In addition,
Panksepp assumes throughout his work that this system is
distinct from the neural system for fear. This is an
important component of Panksepp’s overall research pro-
gram, the core of which are the claims that ‘‘The available
evidence now overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that
basic emotional processes emerge from homologous brain
mechanisms in all mammals’’ (1998, p. 51) and that there
are at least ‘‘…four primal emotional circuits [that] mature
8 The focus on ‘‘feeling states’’ can be a distraction when considering
the psychological traits of nonhuman animals. I think it is less
tendentious to think of emotions as psychological entities that explain
a cluster of visible symptoms (e.g., physiological arousal, facial
expressions, motivation, etc.). In any case, this is what I intend when I
talk about emotions like anger and fear.
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soon after birth, as indexed by the ability of localized brain
stimulation to evoke coherent emotional displays in
experimental animals, and these systems appear to be
remarkably similarly organized in humans’’ (1998, p. 52).
While he does point out that ‘‘there is considerable overlap
and hence neural interaction among systems’’ (1998, p. 53),
his apparent assumption is that each of these neural sys-
tems are distinct (see especially Fig. 3.5 on p. 53) at some
important level of analysis. While some of the proponents
of the defense hypothesis do not share these aims, there is
broad agreement among them that we can best understand
certain types of human aggression, namely impulsive and
instrumental forms of aggression, in terms of dissociable
neural systems for defense and predation, respectively.
Whereas the confrontation hypothesis identifies distinc-
tions between psychological categories through patterns of
behavior, the defense hypothesis identifies these distinc-
tions through neural dissociations.
Importantly, these hypotheses are incompatible. Within
the neurophysiological tradition, the neural dissociation
between predatory and defensive aggression is the main
reason to consider them fundamental, distinct categories of
aggression. However, confrontation and avoidance behav-
iors in rats do not exhibit this kind of clean neural disso-
ciation (Siegel 2004, Chap. 1), or what evidence there is
suggests a neural substrate for confrontational aggression
that is distinct (and perhaps also dissociable) from the
substrate for defense and predation both (see, e.g., Adams
and Boudreau 1993; Canteras 2002). While defensive and
predatory aggression have been elicited in rats by EBS in
the hypothalamus (in roughly homologous brain regions),
neither form of aggression is identical with the confronta-
tional aggression observed in ethological research (Kruk
1991). Confrontational aggression is distinct from preda-
tory aggression in the following respects: Even though
predatory and confrontational attacks both involve back
biting, predatory aggression in rats (elicited by EBS) is
only directed at rat pups and mice, and usually involves
‘‘killing bites’’ to the neck (Woodworth 1971). By contrast,
patterns of confrontational aggression are mostly directed
at uncastrated adult males (as opposed to females or rat
pups), and are nonlethal. Thus, it appears to be aligned with
phenomena of intermale competition, which appear to be
distinct from phenomena of predation (in part because of
these behavioral differences).
Moreover, confrontational aggression is distinct from
defensive aggression in these respects: Many of the
defensive attacks induced by EBS in the VMH do not
specifically target the back and many are accompanied by
alarm calls or escape behaviors (Lammers et al. 1988). By
contrast, confrontational aggression targets the dorsal sur-
faces of the intruder’s neck and back and is accompanied
by approach behaviors, and threat signals. In other words,
the aggression phenomena identified by these different
research programs are behaviorally distinct, and distinct
neural mechanisms seem to be responsible for them.
As a result, these proposals make incompatible infer-
ences about what anger is and also about which aggression
phenomena are its manifestations. According to the con-
frontation hypothesis, anger in humans is responsible for
aggression in response to conspecific challenge (specifi-
cally from an ‘‘intruder’’ or a subordinate), which we
should expect to be distinct from fearful aggression in
humans (e.g., aggression as a response to a life-threatening
situation or a challenge from a formidable opponent).
According to the defense hypothesis, anger in humans is
responsible for impulsive aggression more broadly, which
includes aggression in response to serious threats in addi-
tion to challenges (see, e.g., Blair 2012). In other words,
these proposals make incommensurate inferences about the
nature of angry behavior in humans and other animals.
Importantly, part of the background of this disagreement is
broad agreement that anger is a separate emotion from fear.
Moreover, the main proponents of each hypothesis also
defend putative homologies for fear (Blanchard and Blan-
chard 1984, 2008; Panksepp 1998, Chap. 11). It follows
from this that if either the defense or confrontation system
is homologous with anger, then it cannot be homologous
with fear.
Conflating Kinds: The Defense Hypothesis
While proponents of these hypotheses aim to identify
homologies, there has been little progress in forging a
consensus. I think this is a symptom of a deep epistemic
problem for assessing cognitive homologies. This is not
because of any expectation that consensus should be
reached quickly. Rather it is because the case for the
defense hypothesis has been strikingly tenuous from the
beginning. We can see this by evaluating the evidence in
favor of the defense hypothesis. Since Panksepp proposed
the defense hypothesis, there has been increasing evidence
that the defense system (what he calls the RAGE system) is
not distinct from fear and may very well be a proper part of
the fear system. If so, then the defense hypothesis amounts
to a conflation of two putatively distinct psychological
kinds in cats, anger and fear. I suggest that a mistake of this
kind would be almost impossible in the domain of mor-
phology. It arises primarily because of the boundary
problem: we cannot directly observe boundaries between
instances of psychological kinds.
Before I make this case, I will first say something more
about what I take to be the target of comparison for both
hypotheses of homology concerning anger. I take it that the
appropriate target of the confrontation and defense
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hypotheses is basic human anger, the cluster of properties
(e.g., physiological, endocrine, and postural changes)
associated with involuntary facial expressions of human
anger (Ekman 2003, Chap. 6; Izard 2007; Ekman and
Cordaro 2011). To briefly defend this choice, this is the
most closely studied set of ‘‘anger’’ phenomena the struc-
ture of which is likely explained by biological inheritance
(as opposed to cultural inheritance or similar selection
regimes, etc.), therefore it is the most plausible target for
homology claims. This is because homology claims iden-
tify traits across taxa that are continuous across lineages in
large part due to processes of biological inheritance. As
suggested above, biological inheritance appears to be one
of the causal homeostatic mechanisms that preserve the
structure of homologous traits across lineages (cf. Assis
and Brigandt 2009; Brigandt 2009). Thus, if there is
something like anger in nonhuman animals, then it is most
likely to correspond with phenomena in humans that are
explainable by inheritance, namely the basic emotion of
anger.
The defense system bears some similarities with human
anger that seem to satisfy the criteria of homology. First,
there may be some evidence for continuity across inter-
mediates: stimulation of the hypothalamus of fish, lizards,
chickens, opossums, cats, dogs, rats, and marmosets leads
to defensive forms of attack (Roberts et al. 1967; Bergquist
1970; Panksepp 1971; Woodworth 1971; Lipp and Hun-
sperger 1978).9 In macaques, ventromedial hypothalamic
stimulation also results in attack under certain conditions
(Alexander and Perachio 1973), some of which depend on
whether the EBS occurs in the presence of a higher or
lower ranking conspecific (attack being more likely in the
latter case).
Importantly, the criteria of homology are focused on
internal properties of an entity rather than its relationships
to external entities, and the effects of brain stimulation are
not obviously internal to the entity in question,10 the neural
substrate for the defense system. So the facts about EBS to
the VMH by themselves are not complete evidence for
continuity of intermediates. Rather, this evidence should be
integrated with information about how other components
of the defense system interact with the VMH. For instance,
stimulation of the medial amygdala (a putative component
of the defense system) in cats can potentiate defensive
attacks elicited by EBS in the hypothalamus (e.g., Shaikh
et al. 1993). If there is evidence for a similar relationship
(potentiation of EBS-induced attack by the amygdalae) in
other species, then this would further strengthen claims
about continuity of the defense system as a whole.
There are some hints that continuity obtains with
humans. For instance, there is a handful of case studies
concerning hypothalamic stimulation in humans (with
Parkinson’s disease or obsessive compulsive disorder)
where aggression has been elicited by EBS (see below).
Moreover, in some neuroimaging studies, anger induction
(e.g., through remembering an angering event) has been
correlated with hypothalamus activation (e.g., Damasio and
Grabowski 2000). There is also evidence that amygdala
stimulation can produce feelings of anger in humans (e.g.,
Hitchcock and Cairns 1973). One might take this as pre-
liminary evidence that human anger is subserved by some
of the same pathways that implement defensive behaviors.
Second, consider the criterion of position. As with the
offensive attack observed in ethological work, physiolog-
ical arousal and threat signals do occur prior to defensive
attacks elicited by EBS (e.g., Stoddard-Apter et al. 1983).
The cat’s defensive posture and facial expressions also bear
an apparent similarity to anger, though this similarity has
not been analyzed further. While few call on this as evi-
dence for the hypothesis, I suspect that this similarity is
part of what led scientists to call this behavioral syndrome
‘‘defensive rage,’’ which may have subsequently colored
the way the phenomenon was perceived.
However compelling these similarities may seem, they
are actually quite flimsy as evidence for homology. This
becomes apparent when we look at these results in the
context of a larger body of work concerning the hypotha-
lamus and aggression elicited by brain stimulation. First
consider humans. The region that is associated with
aggression in humans, the triangle of Sano, is not specific
to the VMH, but instead overlaps with the ventromedial
and dorsolateral hypothalamus (the area associated with
predatory aggression) and includes areas between the
posterior hypothalamus and subthalamic nucleus (Sano
et al. 1970; Bejjani et al. 2002; Rosa et al. 2012; Franzini
et al. 2013).11 Surgical lesions (as well as continuous EBS)
within the triangle of Sano region have been shown to
abolish abnormal aggressive behaviors, but most of these
areas are centered around the posterior hypothalamus
9 Delgado (1968) produced aggressive behaviors with electrical
stimulation of the thalamus and cerebellum of chimpanzees and
macaques. However, these brain structures are notably absent from
the defense hypothesis and its descriptions of brain structures
involved in aggression. While Delgado and colleagues did observe
facial expressions during attacks, these facial expressions were not
analyzed.
10 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
11 Panksepp and Biven (2012, p. 150) seem to contradict this by
saying, ‘‘If these kinds of brain-stimulation procedures are carried out
in human beings, people tend to clench their jaws and to report
feelings of intense anger (King 1961; Hitchcock and Cairns 1973;
Mark et al. 1972).’’ However, one can easily see that each of these
studies involves stimulation of the amygdala rather than the
hypothalamus. Moreover, stimulation of the amygdala produces a
multitude of emotional experiences and behaviors, as I discuss in this
section.
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(Rosa et al. 2012; Franzini et al. 2013). Other regions in the
triangle of Sano that produce aggression via EBS are areas
outside the hypothalamus, between the subthalamic
nucleus and the posterior hypothalamus (Bejjani et al.
2002). In sum, while this research suggests a connection
with aggression in humans and activity in and around the
hypothalamus, it does not show localization to the VMH
(or even the hypothalamus more generally).
Nor does stimulation of the VMH in humans provide any
clear evidence that areas within this region are part of a
neural system specific to anger, as some proponents of the
defense hypothesis might predict.12 Stimulation of the VMH
in humans sometimes leads to panic and the feeling of being
chased (Wilent et al. 2010). Similarly, stimulation of the
amygdala during brain surgery induces several other emo-
tional experiences besides anger, including anxiety, guilt,
embarrassment, jealousy, and a ‘‘desire for flight or escape’’
(Hitchcock and Cairns 1973). The latter feelings are usually
associated with fear (see, e.g., Frijda et al. 1989). Thus,
neuroscientific research does not unambiguously support the
defense hypothesis. For all this research, there is as yet no
reason to think that anger is uniquely associated with regions
in the VMH or the amygdala in humans, because it remains
possible that the aggression produced by stimulation of
these areas is associated with fear or emotion more broadly
(including, e.g., shame, disgust, guilt, depression, etc.).
The last 15 years of neurophysiological research in rats
is also telling. Some of this research demonstrates that in
rats, defensive behaviors are associated with some of the
very neural circuits that are specialized for anti-predator
responses (i.e., tonic immobility, freezing, flight, and
fight). In an influential study, Canteras and Chiavegatto
(1997) exposed rats to a natural predator (a cat), and
observed subsequent Fos immunoreactivity (a well-known
indicator of preceding neural activity) in the hypothalamus
and surrounding area. This revealed activation in a con-
stellation of sites, including among others the VMH
(dorsomedial aspect), the anterior hypothalamic nucleus,
the dorsal premammillary nucleus, and importantly, the
perifornical region. Similar research on reproduction and
agonistic behavior (including confrontation behaviors)
reveals Fos immunoreactivity in distinct regions of male
rat brains—the VMH (ventrolateral aspect, see also
Fig. 2c), the medial preoptic nucleus, and the ventral
premammillary nucleus (Kollack-Walker and Newman
1995)—after either mating or intermale competition (a
resident-intruder confrontation with another male rat).
Subsequent work supports the claim that there are two
distinct systems here, one that underpins innate defensive
responses to predators and another that underpins innate
reproductive and agonistic responses to conspecifics
Fig. 2 Hypothalamic areas associated with aggression. a Sites at
which EBS elicits defensive rage (gray shading ) and predatory attack
(round black shading ) in cats (based on Siegel et al. 1999). Note that
the gray is located on the dorsomedial aspect of the VMH, and thus
corresponds more closely with the regions associated with anti-
predator behavior in rats (cf. Canteras and Chiavegatto 1997). b Sites
from which EBS elicits conspecific biting attacks (gray shading
directed at the back, head and neck regions) and mouse killing attacks
(round black shading) in rats (based on Lammers et al. 1988;
Woodworth 1971). c Sites from which optogenetic stimulation elicits
biting attacks (usually directed at the back) on both male and female
intruders in mice (based on Lin et al. 2011). Note that this is the
ventrolateral aspect of the VMH. Abbreviations (excerpted from
Haller 2013): 3rd V 3rd ventricle, AHp anterior hypothalamic nucleus,
posterior part, ARC arcuate nucleus, DH dorsal hypothalamic area,
DMH dorsomedial hypothalamic nucleus, F fornix, Fil nucleus
filiformis, IC internal capsule, LHA lateral hypothalamic area, OT
optic tract, PVN paraventricular hypothalamic nucleus, RE nucleus
reuniens, VMH ventromedial hypothalamic nucleus, TCA tuber
cinereum area, ZI zona incerta From Haller (2013), p. 99  Elsevier.
Originally published in Brain Research Bulletin
12 This is predicted under Panksepp’s assumption that distinct neural
systems underpin distinction emotions (e.g., RAGE and FEAR), as
discussed above. Thanks to two anonymous reviewers for pressing me
to clarify this point.
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including confrontation and avoidance behaviors (for a
review, see Canteras 2002).
These results call into question whether research on
defensive rage in cats is really focused on a psychological
state like anger in humans, which is supposed to be distinct
from fear and anti-predator behaviors. In cats, it is pri-
marily the dorsomedial aspect of the VMH that causes
defensive rage, the very same region in rats that becomes
active after exposure to a predator (see Fig. 2a). If this area
were specific to anger across a range of species, one would
not expect it to be associated with anti-predator responses
in rodents, as Canteras and others have observed. More-
over, EBS-induced defensive attacks in rats (which have
been compared with defensive rage in cats) are clearly part
of the repertoire of anti-predator behaviors, e.g., flight and
freezing behaviors that are commonly associated with fear.
For example, it is well known that rats will mount leaping
attacks toward cats once they are cornered or in close
proximity (usually after freezing and flight responses have
been ineffective, Blanchard and Blanchard 2008, p. 66).
Moreover, these attacks appear to serve the purpose of
creating a window for escape and avoidance. Accordingly,
subsequent research has shown that these defensive attacks
can also be elicited by stimulation of the perifornical
region (see references in Roeling et al. 1994), a region in
which stimulation (whether electrical or chemical) can
elicit either escape or antipredator attack behaviors (in
rats). At first glance, the defense hypothesis would not
necessarily predict that multiple areas associated with
defensive attacks would also be associated with
antipredator behavior.13 These observations are better
predicted by the hypothesis that defensive behaviors are the
products of fear or of systems for predator avoidance, both
of which are supposed to be distinct from anger. Given the
bulk of this research, defensive aggression is more likely to
be a context-dependent component of the fear response in
rats as a wealth of other work suggests (e.g., Adams 2006;
Blanchard and Blanchard 2008). At the very least, the
current evidence clearly does not support a unique local-
ization within the VMH for defensive aggression as distinct
from components of fear (or antipredator) responses in rats,
nor is there any evidence (to my knowledge) that defensive
rage is distinct from antipredator responses in cats. If so,
then defensive aggression (in both rats and cats) may very
well be a product of fear rather than anger.
As it turns out, much of the work that Panksepp
(Panksepp 1998; Panksepp and Zellner 2004; Panksepp and
Biven 2012) cites in favor of the defense hypothesis is not
linked to anger in any distinctive way. For instance,
Panksepp references the work of Allan Siegel to support
the defense hypothesis, but Siegel does not even advocate
the defense hypothesis, and in many cases makes claims
that contradict it. In several places (including Siegel 2004)
Siegel compares defensive behaviors with a disorder
known as episodic discontrol, which is marked by ‘‘…de-
creased impulse control—a characteristic common to
defensive behavior—and altered perceptual states follow-
ing stimuli evoking anger, fear or rage’’ (Siegel and Vic-
toroff 2009, p. 213; emphasis mine). Indeed, many of the
similarities that are noted between defensive behaviors and
these forms of human aggression are characteristics of
affectively driven behavior in general. Impulsivity is a
characteristic of many kinds of emotion expression (see,
e.g., Frijda 1986, 2010), including fear, anger, disgust,
sadness, and joy.
So it looks as if the similarities between the defense
system and human anger may be only apparent. In reality,
the evidence is weak that this system is distinct from a
neural system (or systems14) for fear, and in fact, there
never was any such evidence. At this juncture, it seems
much more likely that the defense system is simply part of
the fear system.
Importantly, this discussion has been operating under
the assumptions that (a) homologous emotional states
remain tied to homologous brain structures across lineages,
and that (b) the relevant neural regions are emotion-specific
and dissociable. Both are claims to which Panksepp is
clearly committed (cf. the discussion above). Indeed, the
main body of his work in affective neuroscience appears to
be an extended defense of these claims (or perhaps an
outgrowth of these assumptions). Nevertheless, these
assumptions stand in tension with what I said previously
about cognitive homologies. Such homologies are
homologies of function (Love 2007) that need not be linked
to homologous structures (cf. Ereshefsky 2007) and that
could potentially be realized by some of the same neural
components. Accordingly, one can distinguish the defense
13 Panksepp does try to explain why neural systems for fear and
anger should be ‘‘interdigitated’’: ‘‘It makes good evolutionary sense
for FEAR and RAGE circuits to be intimately related for one of the
functions of anger is to provoke fear in competitors, and one of the
functions of fear is to reduce the impact of angry behaviors from
threatening opponents’’ (1998, p. 208). While this may explain the
functional relationships between anger and fear, it remains puzzling
how this would explain their neuroanatomical relationship, which is
what ‘‘interdigitation’’ apparently refers to. That is, why and how
would inter-organismal interactions predict close intra-organismal
neuroanatomical organization? Regardless of whether there is a
sensible answer to this question, interdigitation does not cancel
functional, and perhaps also physical separateness of these neural
systems for Panksepp. The next sentence reads as follows: ‘‘Although
it has not been empirically demonstrated, it is reasonable to suppose
that at low levels of arousal, the two systems are mutually
inhibitory….’’
14 There is now some evidence in rats to distinguish fear of predators
and fear of conspecifics (Gross and Canteras 2012).
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hypothesis as Panksepp articulates it from other versions of
the hypothesis, which relax Panksepp’s two assumptions.
Nevertheless, the case for the defense hypothesis is not
substantially strengthened by relaxing these assumptions.
First, if one relaxes the assumption (a) that emotions are
tied to homologous brain areas, the hypothesis still fails to
predict extensive overlap between regions that elicit
defensive attack as well as other antipredator responses in
rats. On the contrary, relaxing this assumption actually
diminishes the testability of the defense hypothesis by
making it less committed to specific predictions about the
effects of EBS. To see this, consider that the modified
hypothesis would look something like this: human anger is
homologous with the system responsible for defensive
aggression in cats, which arises from a neural system that
includes the VMH, the amygdala, and parts of the brain
stem in cats but may or may not arise from these regions in
humans. If we cannot assume that homologous emotions
track homologous brain regions, we cannot make clear
predictions about what emotional outcomes we should
expect EBS to have in homologous brain regions in
humans. If so, then the results of EBS cannot provide
substantial support for this theory over a range of other
theories. At least, this remains true unless the hypothesis is
supplemented by plausible assumptions about which kinds
of shifts in function brain regions will undergo over evo-
lutionary time and phylogenetic space.
Second, one could relax the apparent assumption (b) that
a brain area such as the VMH is associated with a single
cognitive function. Relaxing this assumption seems plau-
sible because, as Anderson (2007, 2010) argues, there is
considerable evidence that different neural systems get
deployed for multiple different functions depending on task
demands. Moreover, one might expect that more ancient
brain regions (VMH being quite ancient) are likely to be
deployed for a greater number of different functions. As
applied to the defense hypothesis, we might imagine that
certain constituents of the defense system can also be
deployed to serve separate functions, such as the produc-
tion of other emotional states. If either of these assump-
tions is relaxed, then the defense hypothesis no longer
predicts that neural substrates for anger will be distinct
from the substrates for other emotions or that areas like the
central amygdala or VMH will be specific to anger. Nev-
ertheless, in that case the defense hypothesis also loses a
good deal of its testability. For one, there would be few
interesting predictions to make concerning the effects of
EBS on its own. Rather, we might expect effects of EBS to
be radically context specific (especially in humans), since
activity in a given region could interact with a number of
different functions that may or may not be engaged in a
single context. The overall point is that hypothesis testing
requires that theories make competing predictions. But
relaxing either of these two assumptions undercuts the
ability of the defense hypothesis to make clear predictions
that distinguish it from the confrontation hypothesis, and
hence undercuts the evidential value of EBS data in
humans and rats.
So why did the defense hypothesis seem compelling in
the first place? Part of the problem is that homologies are
more difficult to assess in the cognitive domain than in the
morphological domain. Recall that the boundaries between
psychological units within a given organism are typically
inferred, rather than being directly observed. This results in
the boundary problem: that it is difficult to determine the
boundaries between instances of psychological states. The
same cannot be said of skeletal homologies or the devel-
opmental units (e.g., limb buds, gill arches) from which
they arise. While instances of morphological units (and the
boundaries that may separate them) may not all be directly
observable, they are a good deal closer to the observable
end of the spectrum than instances of psychological kinds.
The latter are perhaps one of the clearest cases of unob-
servable entities. To be clear, the point is not that the
existence of psychological kinds are inferred (as is the
existence of abstract morphological units), rather it is
that the existence of instances of psychological kinds is
inferred in a wide range of cases (though I do not entirely
rule out the possibility that instances can be directly per-
ceived). By contrast, in the domain of morphology, even
variables that are less directly observable, such as distinct
patterns of gene expression in development, appear to be
tightly linked to distinct developmental/morphological
units, such as distinct limb buds or distinct gill arches. This
makes competing claims of morphological homology much
easier to adjudicate in the domain of morphology.
If we consider cases in which there was uncertainty,
perhaps even competition, between hypotheses of mor-
phological homology, we can see that these issues are often
resolved by the careful study of developmental structures
and the processes by which they differentiate into distinct
skeletal structures. For instance, resolution of the cases of
mammalian ossicle homology and avian digit homology
(e.g., Takechi and Kuratani 2010; Wagner 2005, respec-
tively) depended on a kind of continuity of developmental
intermediates assessed by a combination of methods like
embryo dissection, evaluating the effects of selective gene
knockouts, and detecting patterns of gene expression.15
While some of these methods are theory-laden, they could
not proceed without access to clearly observable bound-
aries between instances of morphological units, such as the
boundaries between bone structures or the boundaries
between limb bud and body cavity. These are exactly the
15 Thanks to Alan Love for pointing out the relevance of these
examples.
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kind of observable boundaries that are lacking in the psy-
chological domain.
Now, if the neural system for defensive aggression is
really homologous with fear in humans, as I have sug-
gested, then the confusion here is actually on par with
confusing the anterior and posterior limb buds on an
embryo or the radius and the ulna on a tetrapod skeleton.
This kind of confusion is hardly even possible in the
morphological domain, precisely because we are able to
directly observe the boundaries between instances of
morphological units (e.g., posterior and anterior limb
buds, radius and ulna). Were it possible to directly
observe the cause of defensive aggression in cats and
observe its relation (or lack thereof) to other causes of
feline aggression, then questions would immediately arise
about which (if any) cause of aggression bears distinctive
similarities with human anger. In the morphological case,
one is able to notice these boundaries without making any
prior inferences about them, and this knowledge inevi-
tably guides the identification of homologs across various
species.
A Constraint on Homology Claims
As a result, it is worth making explicit the role that this
knowledge plays in homology inferences. I suggest that
this knowledge constrains the kind of similarities admitted
as evidence for homology. The relevant constraint derives
from the fact that there are different homology relations at
different levels of generality. To see this, notice first that
each general homology captures all the traits (of various
organisms) that are continuous and correspondent at some
level of a hierarchy (cf. Ramsey and Peterson 2012) . For
instance, all tetrapods with forelimbs have forelimbs with a
similar structure, and this is because each tetrapod forelimb
is continuous with the forelimb of the common ancestral
tetrapod (the first population of vertebrates to live on land)
and numerically identical across the range of ancestors that
link each lineage to the ancestral tetrapod. As a result,
tetrapod forelimbs form a homology class. Moreover, the
class of tetrapod forelimbs is nested within a larger, more
general homology class, the class of paired appendages.
This is because the forelimb of the ancestral tetrapod itself
was derived from (and hence continuous with) the paired
appendages of its common ancestor with gnathostomes
more broadly.16 Accordingly, the forelimbs of amphibians,
reptiles, avians, and mammals are members of the
homology class of tetrapod forelimbs, but they are also
members of the more general, inclusive homology class of
paired appendages, which also includes the pectoral fins of
sharks and bony fish, among others.17 Thus, a given
homology class can be nested within a broader homology
class.
Importantly, while pectoral fins are homologous with
instances of tetrapod forelimbs as paired appendages, the
similarities between pectoral fins and tetrapod forelimbs do
not provide good evidence for homology in the less
inclusive class of tetrapod forelimbs. Inclusion in this more
specific class is indicated by bone structures (e.g., radius
and ulna) that are absent in pectoral fins. These structures
are due to modifications that occurred subsequent to the
divergence of tetrapods from teleosts, and that is why tel-
eost pectoral fins are not included in this homology class.
Consequently, we can see that some similarities only
indicate inclusion in a broader homology class (e.g., paired
appendages), whereas other similarities indicate inclusion in
narrower homology classes (e.g., tetrapod forelimbs). It
follows that, when evaluating similarities between traits, it is
sometimes necessary to consider which homology class a
similarity indicates. Moreover, when one identifies a specific
homology class, similarities can only count as evidence for
inclusion in that class if the following constraint is met.
Class-specificity constraint: To provide evidence for
relations of homology relative to homology class G as
opposed to the more inclusive class, H, requires that
some similarities between relata are not shared by
traits in the more inclusive class, H.
This constraint limits the evidence for homology in rela-
tion to a specific homology class at a specific level of gen-
erality. The constraint captures why the similarities between
human forelimbs and the dolphin pectoral fin indicate
membership in the homology class of tetrapod forelimbs
while similarities with the shark pectoral fin do not.
This constraint might easily be confused with a rule to
avoid conflating symplesiomorphies and synapomorphies.
Put simply, synapomorphies are characters that are shared by
members of monophyletic group, a group that includes all
and only the descendants of a common ancestor. By contrast,
symplesiomorphies are similarities shared only between
paraphyletic groups, such as the similarities between shark
fins and teleost fish fins (which are not shared by all the
16 This clade includes animals descended from cartilaginous (chon-
drichthyes) and bony fish (osteichthyes), the latter of which were the
ancestors of the tetrapods.
17 Another way of putting this point is to distinguish between
characters and character-states, where characters are determinables
and character-states are determinates (cf. Brigandt and Griffiths 2007,
p. 635). For instance, animals can possess or lack paired appendages
(character), and this character can appear in different states within a
lineage (ray fin, tetrapod forelimb, etc.). This characterization too is
subject to levels of generality because something that is a character-
state at one level of generality (e.g., tetrapod forelimb) is a character
with distinct character-states (e.g., amphibian forelimb, avian fore-
limb, mammalian forelimb, etc.) at a lower level of generality.
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common ancestors of chondrichthys and osteichthys). The
class-specificity constraint does not function to distinguish
characters in this way. If we note the similarity in pectoral
fins, the constraint does not tell us whether the similarity is a
symplesiomorphy or a synapomorphy. Rather, the constraint
says that if this character indicates homology (which it may),
it indicates homology only at the broadest level at which
relevant similarities obtain. Let us consider the relevant
similarities. Themain similarity in pectoral fins is that the left
and right fins are symmetrical, but there are also similarities
in internal structure (e.g., divisions between axial and radial
portions) and perhaps also developmental mechanisms. The
question posed by the constraint is whether these similarities
only obtain between ray fin fish and cartilaginous fish. If the
similarities obtain more broadly (we should predict that most
of them will), then the indicated homology class is more
inclusive than ray fin fish and cartilaginous fish. After all,
there is a relationship of homology between pectoral fins of
these species, it is just not exclusive to these two clades.
Specifically, paired appendages are shared by the entire
monophyletic group of gnathostomes (with the exception of
species inwhich paired appendageswere lost, as in serpentes,
cetacea, and caecilia). As a result, the class-specificity con-
straint allows finer-grained distinctions between traits than
the distinction between synapomorphies and symple-
siomorphies, since it operates within monophyletic groups
and can distinguish between two or more synapomorphies.
For instance, it is easy to see how it could distinguish between
tetrapod forelimbs (shared by dolphins and humans, for
instance) and paired appendages (shared by dolphins,
humans, and sharks) given the similarities that they share.
The examples so far deal straightforwardly with mor-
phology or body structure. Moreover, one might think that as
it applies to these cases, the class-specificity constraint is so
obvious as to make its articulation unnecessary. On the
contrary, I suspect that what is obvious concerning mor-
phology is easily confused concerning behavior or psy-
chology. That is, one can find similarities that seem to
indicate cognitive homology and more easily misidentify the
homology class that this evidence concerns. In doing so, one
violates the class-specificity constraint. I think this is one of
the main reasons why the defense hypothesis has persisted
without refutation over such a long period of time. After all,
there are similarities between anger and fear that may indi-
cate some kind of continuity. For instance, it is possible that
they are serial homologs, which are structures or functions
that are duplicated within a single organism (like the verte-
brae or retinotopic maps in visual areas of the brain,
respectively; see especially Murphy (2012)) and many of
which may derive from a single trait in an organism’s
ancestors. Nevertheless, the current evidence suggests that
the similarities between the defense system and human anger
do not indicate homology at a level that includes anger and
excludes fear (as both the defense hypothesis and the con-
frontation hypothesis propose).
What the class-specificity constraint requires then, is
information regarding distinctness in each species being
compared. In the example concerning shark and ray fin
fish, the appropriate relation of homology is clarified by
information about the internal structure of the fins, infor-
mation that distinguishes the more from the less general
class. Similarly, the appropriate relation of homology (or
lack thereof) between the defense system in cats and anger
in humans could be clarified by information that distin-
guishes a more general class (e.g., that includes all emo-
tions) from a less general one (e.g., that includes only
anger). While proponents of the defense hypothesis have
attended to evidence for a distinction between defense and
predation, they have not attended to evidence for a dis-
tinction between defense and fear.18
By contrast, consider the confrontation hypothesis.
There is clear evidence for distinctness between characters
that may correspond to anger and fear in humans. Mani-
festations of the confrontation and avoidance systems in
rats can be distinguished by quantifiable differences in the
facial expressions of residents and intruders (Defensor
et al. 2012), just as manifestations of anger and fear in
humans can be distinguished by their distinctive facial
expressions (e.g., Ekman and Friesen 1971). Moreover,
resident and intruder rats have distinct forms of attack with
distinct target sites. Thus, it is possible to distinguish within
rats at least two different patterns of affective behavior
accompanied by distinct facial expressions.
On its own, this is not a particularly strong form of evidence
in favor of this hypothesis. However, there are other similar-
ities between confrontation behaviors in rats and angry
behaviors in humans that are dissimilar to fearful behaviors in
various respects. One interesting piece of evidence for
homology is a special quality that is shared by rats and
stumptail macaques. Adams and Shoel (1981) note that
dominant macaques and resident rats both implement strate-
gies aimed at accessing and biting the backs of subordinates.19
18 However, ethologists have pointed to some evidence for a
distinction between two patterns of intraspecific aggression: aggres-
sion in subordinates (which may correspond with defensive aggres-
sion) and ‘‘offensive’’ aggression in dominants (see Leyhausen 1979).
This distinction may parallel that between confrontational and
avoidant aggression in rats and a range of other mammals (see,
e.g., Blanchard and Blanchard 1984). If so, then defensive aggression
in cats may correspond with avoidant aggression.
19 This may be an instance of a broader set of behaviors in mammals
involving ritualized aggression that involves target attack sites.
Target sites are usually accompanied by specialized defenses or
weapons such as the lion’s mane and the ram’s horns. See Blanchard
and Blanchard (1984) as well as Leyhausen (1979) for an extensive
overview of target sites and ritualized aggression in a wide range of
mammals.
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In macaques, this behavior seems arbitrary with respect to the
(probable) function of inflicting nonlethal damage on the
subordinate.Macaques have amuch larger repertoire of bodily
movements than rats, many of which could serve the function
of inflicting nonlethal harm (pushing, kicking, scratching,
slapping, holding, etc.). Thus, back biting is a special quality,
and the best explanation of this behavior may appeal to
products of common ancestry (and thus phylogenetic conti-
nuity). In other words, the reason that the attacks of both rats
and macaques are aimed at biting the neck and back may be
that they share a common ancestor with a corresponding
aggressive strategy and perhaps similar motivational mecha-
nisms for negotiating conflict with conspecifics.20
At this point, no solid connection has been made with
human anger. That is, we have no independent reason to think
that dominant macaques attack subordinates out of anger.
However, a tenuous case can be made on the basis of facial
expressions. In other studies of macaque behavior, macaques
with higher dominance status do display facial expressions
(i.e., ‘‘stare,’’ ‘‘round-mouthed stare’’, and ‘‘open-mouthed
stare’’) toward lower-ranking macaques in aggressive
encounters, expressions that resemble anger expressions in
humans and are distinct from fear expressions (Chevalier-
Skolnikoff 1974). Chevalier-Skolnikoff (1973) argues that
two of these expressions are continuous (recruiting homolo-
gous facial muscles) across macaques, chimps, and humans.
Some confirmation of these comparisons has been attained by
using a facial action coding system to quantify chimpanzee
facial expressions (Parr et al. 2007). Thus, there is tenuous
evidence for continuity across intermediates between human
anger and a putative confrontation system across the common
ancestors of these species. Importantly, the similarities
between human anger and the confrontation system in rats do
not violate the class-specificity constraint on homology claims
(relativized to a homology class that only includes the emotion
of anger). Specifically, there is tentative evidence for aggres-
sion syndromes in rats, macaques, and humans that are distinct
from fear (or rather traits that seem to correspond with fear) in
each of these species. Some of the observed similarities
between these ‘‘anger’’ syndromes (e.g., back biting in rats and
macaques, facial expressions of anger in primates) are not
shared with fear (or any other emotions for that matter). Thus,
these similarities satisfy the operational criteria of homology
in ways that are not also satisfied by other emotions like fear.
Conclusion
While the case here is far from conclusive, we can derive
some lessons from the contrast between the two hypothe-
ses. First and foremost, to satisfy the class-specificity
constraint, we need evidence of distinctness between
characters and continuity of that distinction across inter-
mediates. This kind of evidence is not as easy to come by
in the domains of psychology and behavior by comparison
with morphology. In the latter domain, the method of
individuation can be as straightforward as boiling an ani-
mal’s corpse. With this and other methods, we can directly
observe the boundaries between radius and ulna, forelimb
and hindlimb, in each species we want to compare. By
contrast, in the psychological case we need a way of in-
ferring distinct boundaries in each species we compare and
ensuring that the same boundaries exist in each animal we
compare. This problem may be even more pressing in the
domain of nosology, where distinctions between behaviors
or cognitive systems are sometimes essential for diagnos-
ing distinct forms of dysfunction and where animal models
of dysfunction are important tools for testing therapeutic
interventions.
A second moral of this story is that homologies are
rarely discovered piecemeal. This case of cognitive
homology helps us to see that homologies sometimes must
be assessed in pairs or larger n-tuples. If skeletal homology
led us to believe otherwise, it was only because the
boundaries between units are often so clearly observable.
The inferences afforded by our visual systems work so
well, their operations are almost invisible to us.
Third and less obvious, while homology may be the key
to decomposing the mind into natural units, it is no silver
bullet. Stereotyped behaviors (e.g., involuntary facial
expressions), rigid behavioral goals (e.g., biting the back of
a subordinate), and neural localization can provide some
easy-to-infer anchors for assessing cognitive homology.
Nevertheless, when goals become more diffuse, means
more variegated, and soft assembled neural systems
recruited (e.g., Anderson 2007), more tenuous inferences
become necessary.
Consider an example: we clearly share certain appetites
with nonhuman animals. We might easily conjecture that
thirst, hunger, and lust are driven by highly conserved
mechanisms across mammals and perhaps tetrapods more
broadly. Nevertheless, if all we know is that a human male
is cooking a gourmet meal, we need a good deal more
information and inference to tease apart which aspects of
this performance are means to satisfaction of hunger, lust,
or even a secondary appetite for money. Insofar as evolved
emotions include flexible motivational states, the causes of
human aggression may be equally difficult to pull apart. If
20 Adams and Schoel actually argue for homology by considering
similarity in the dynamics of attack and submission across both
species. I do not find their argument very compelling.
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all we know is that someone was verbally excoriated, we
need a good deal more information and inference to assess
whether fear, anger, jealousy, or even money were the
motives behind the verbal abuse. The more flexible the
motivational state, the more diffuse its connection with
observable behavior, and the more difficult it is to
homologize.
To sum up, I have suggested that competing claims of
cognitive homology are symptomatic of a unique and
unaddressed problem for homology thinking in the cog-
nitive domain: the boundary problem. The problem is that
the instances of many psychological kinds are not directly
observable. One way to mitigate this problem is to sup-
plement the operational criteria of homology with explicit
use of the class-specificity constraint. In combination with
the operational criteria of homology this constraint helps
to specify what kind of evidence supports homology
claims, namely, identification of unique correspondences
that indicate common membership in a specific homology
class; correspondences that provide evidence for common
ancestry (or phylogenetic continuity more broadly) as
opposed to common selection pressures (whether, cultural,
developmental, or ancestral). Moreover, it motivates the
search for boundaries between two or more candidate
homologies within each organism being compared. With
this constraint in hand, homology thinking can provide
independent criteria for evaluating substantive disagree-
ments concerning the nature of psychological kinds.
Because this constraint was neglected, an ultimately
flimsy hypothesis of homology, the defense hypothesis,
has remained a serious competitor for far too long.
Thinking carefully about homology in the cognitive
domain and paying due respect to the class-specificity
constraint can help to guide the future search for
homologies and thus aid the project of decomposing the
mind into natural units.
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